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I) THE DUNCAN REPORT
by Guy Hunter*
The Duncan Report, often so able and useful in its
detail, is surely one of the most short-sighted, and indeed
ignoble, public documents to have appeared in recent years.
If the nation were on its knees and if the course recom-
mended could alone save it, that might possibly be excused.
But in fact it is barely relevant to the causes of our
difficulties and, in the long run, could make the symptoms
not better but worse. Our balance of payments problem is
not due to spending that £5m.-lOm. too much on overseas
representation which the Report would have us save, but
to far deeper causes in our home economy and society. To
make a trifling contribution to this malady the Report
suggests that we should recast not only the structure of
our diplomacy but the very image of Britain in the world.
The Committee accepted terms of reference which
begged a vital question. They were instructed "to bear
mm... .the importance of obtaining maximum value for
all British Government expenditure and the consequent
desirability of providing British overseas representation
at lesser cost". Why 'consequent'? It is certainly
possible that we are wasting overheads and high quality
staff by spending marginally too little.
The Committee accepted, with apparent enthusiasm,
that their prime task was "to make recommendations part-
icularly on the furtherance of British commercial and
economic Interests overseas" and to achieve this further-
ance at less cost. But they went further than this, and
begged a far larger question. For, defining our overseas
services as "an instrument of British interests", they
revealed the narrowness of this definition by insisting
on "the towering importance of the balance of payments"
and "the clear precedence that belongs to the commercial
objective in the day-to-day conduct of British relations
with other countries". It is true that later on other
interests are mentioned - "the reduction of East-West
tension.....the sustaining of Commonwealth links...,
the improvement of economic conditions in the less dey-
eloped countries, and the strengthening of international
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organisation". But these interests do not deflect the
Committee f rom their determination to spend less and to
put commerce first.
But the Committee was not asked to assign such
priorities within general British policy or to put clear
precedence on direct commercial endeavour above other
long-term policy aims. To win friendship and respect,
to help redress the balance of wealth and poverty, to
heal the running sore of racialism, to take an inter-
national rather than a nationalist view - such aims may
well be more essential even to our commercial interests.
To earn a living is as vital for a nation as to breathe
for an individual; that done, the purposes of life can
be pursued: only dying men or hypochondriacs proclaim
the towering importance of breathing.
Having made these enormous assumptions, the Committee
first set about their task of finding savings by dividing
the world into an Area of Concentration (Europe and
North America, with Australia and Japan tacked on) and
the "Outer Area", i.e. the rest of the world. That
diplomacy and the furtherance of British interests
require a different style in these areas is certainly
true and important; the old Foreign Office style is
singularly ill-adapted to much of the Third World. That1
the "Outer Area" is less important is manifestly untrue.
Vietnam has had a certain importance in world affairs -
at least enough to topple a President of the United
States. Suez, South Africa-Rhodesia-Zambia, have had a
certain impact on the reputation and friendships of
Britain and on her commercial interests. India - 500
million friendly and democratic people - is not altogether
negligible. All these are part of the "Outer Area", in
which the Committee suggest that British representation
should be reduced and commercialised.
For in this Outer Area the prime aim of British
policy, if this Report were accepted, would be to make a
The Committee did not say it was less important, in so
many words. But since "Outer" cannot mean 'further' than
Australia or Japan, it must mean 'of less importance',
at least to Britain.
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hard sell, reducing political staff and emphasising
commercial representation accordingly. It is not only
that a short-term payments crisis is to be met, not by
short-term measures in the right place but by institution-
alising a form of foreign representation which is likely
to last for a generation. Worse still, it is far from
clear that this form is best suited even to the short-
term need. In dozens of countries the direction of
trade is not decided by private entrepreneurs on
economic grounds, but by governments on grounds which
are largely ideological, or State-socialist, or reflect
a preference for dealing with friends. In fact, the
way to further 'British interests' in most developing
countries is to show some active competence in helping
them to achieve their own interests; in gaining a
reputation for sympathy, reliability, wide local
knowledge and real concern. Perhaps the best way to
damage British interests is to proclaim in public the
determination to make a hard sell to countries highly
suspicious of colonial and capitalist pressure.
Hard selling and hard diplomacy in Europe is
acceptable. Relations with India, Pakistan, Indonesia -
to name just 750 millions of the "Outer Area" - needs an
attitude and a type of representation which the Committèe
show little sign of defining. It certainly needs
enough staff, of the right kind, to go out and see the
projects and achievements and problems of the country's
development effort, to meet the men in the field, and to
speak to governments from first-hand and competent
knowledge of their situations. Many of those who have
travelled widely in the "Outer Area" have been horrified
to find British Embàssy staff (with notable exceptions)
chained to their desks by administrative work by day
and exchanging guesses with colleagues in the evening
diplomatic round. The best of them are highly conscious
of this: to reduce staff would only make matters worse.
The administration of £200m. of British aid highlights
this problem. It receives a singularly half-hearted
treatment by the Committee. Aid requires both expertise
and a good deal of routine administration. As to experts,
it might have been thought sensible, if economy is the
watchword, to centralise some expertise in Development
Divisions as in the Middle East and the Caribbean. Bnt
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these are damned with praise so faint as scarcely to be
audible: they are rather strangely described as a
successful experiment which should not be repeated.
As to administration, it is certainly not sensible, if the
Mission staffs are to be relied on so heavily, to tie
them even longer to their desks with the administrative
chores of aid or to expect them to be expert in
irrigation, education, range-management and computers.
If £200m. is worth spending, it is worth adequate
ai1n4nistrative and technical support.
As a contrast, it is worth looking at the Ford
Foundation work for Indian agriculture. The sums spent
are considerable, but not large in relation to the British
aid effort. But they have had immense effect, in a
critical sector, an effect spreading over the length and
breadth of India. The Foundation's administrative costs
have probably been extremely high in relation to total
funds spent. But the critical ratio is not this but the
ratio of total funds spent to total results achieved.
The Duncan ReF.ort notes that the administrative costs of
technical assistance are high; but the cost-result
ratio may be extremely favourable: for example, one
British technical mission to Tanzania persuaded that
government to halt a settlement programme which could
easily have reached the scale of the groundnut catastrophe.
"To help developing countries to help themselves",
as the Ford programme has done, needs technical competence
and understanding of their problems in the field. This
is especially true of rural development, which is bound
to play a far greater part in the '70s than in the '60s.
This means more staff, not less. In Delhi the US Embassy
and AID have a large trained agricultural staff; the
British agricultural staff at least cannot be reduced
it does not exist. In commercial terms, American case-
studies and text-books are used in the agricultural
universities; American jeeps by the thousand carry the
Extension staff; American machines are used in the
Agricultural Engineering faculties and Extension
training centres; American offset printing presses
churn out the Farmers' Bulletins. There are 60 million
farm holdings in India; there is an unrivalled knowledge
of tropical peasant agriculture in England; closer contact
between the two might surely be profitable, in every
sense, to both sides.
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The section of the Report dealing with attaches is
that which is most ruthlessly determined to get a quart
out of a pint pot. The Conmiittee may well be right in
thinking that specialists should be part of the Mission
staff, not seconded from a 13K Ministry. But it is simply
not good enough to rely on the shiboleths of "a course
of as little as a month in development economics" or some
familiarity with modern methods of industriel management
(managing a steel works, or a biscuit factory, or a coal
mine? in England or Brazil or India? - the methods are apt
to differ): these bits of top dressing will not turn a
generalist into a competent economist or agricultural
adviser. Curiously, five of the eight British agricultural
attaches now in post are not agricultural but food-trade
specialists, stationed at Washington, Brussels, Copenhagen,
Wellington and Canberra; only two (Nairobi and Lagos) are
concerned with the development of local agriculture.
India, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Philippines - about 850 million, of whom 70% are in
agriculture - surely merit just one man on the British
staff with competence in the immense problems of agricultural
investment and administration.
The Committee call their recommended pattern ' the
New Diplomacy'. Alas, it is not new, but reflects a set
of negative attitudes which have been influencing British
affairs at home and abroad for some time now. The short
view of immediate cash advantage - like the 'hard-headed'
businessman who cuts his development department to save
a few salaries: the view that Britain is poor because in
deficit - like the rich landlord who cannot affort to
mend his poor tenant's roof because his yacht costs so
much nowadays; the belief in economic man - not only
ignoble but hopelessly inaccurate; the disbelief in
imponderables, drawn from the lesser economists who
suggest that only what is immediately quantifiable is real
these are some of the attitudes which have produced this
strange Report.
Let us consider two possible futures. First, that
the payments deficit is wiped out by better management of
the British society: then the savings overseas - about
0.5Z of extra exports would cover them - would be seen to
have been unnecessary - but only after running down our
service. Second, that it is not wiped out: then, the
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result would be a downward spiral; for, the deficit
recurring, there would be a demand for further savings
overseas to maintain standards of life at home - schools,
hospitals, wage-rises and all the rich man's rights - a
further loss of contact and influence in the export
market, a further deficit.
If the Committee had stuck to a programme of
getting better value for money in the Outer Area, with
all the implications as to style of action and type of
staff, the Report would have made better sense and given
a less deplorable total impression. For how would
Britain's New Diplomacy be seen abroad, with its opening
fanfare played on cash-registers - "the clear precedence
that belongs to the commercial objective in the day-to-
day conduct of British relations with other countries"?
A concentration on the rich man1s area, and a reduction
of effort outside it; that reduced effort to be
focused on commercial sales, in countries highly
suspicious of commercial pressure; a lack of faith
that economic development among two-thirds of the world's
population will in fact succeed enough to make their
future trade worth our pains; a repeated emphasis on
British interests alone, against the best elements of
international concern for the growing inequalities and
violence in the world - no one could be blamed for so
reading this document. And at borné? If we are to
break out from our self-absorption, from the internal
jealousies and envy which are te dangers of progress
to greater wealth and equality, then some sense of
service to an external ideal, a role for ourselves in
the world a little more inspiring than the interests of
a nation of shopkeepers, is surely needed. A nation
lives by the renewal of its best tradition and ideals:
if we do not need de Gaulle, we do need a vision a
little more inspiring than Duncan.
1de Tocqueville and T.S. Eliot, in their different
ways, have both pointed to this dark side of the coin.
